The Record - 
At what point do we say “enough is enough” about U.S. military involvement in the civil conflict in Iraq?

Many Americans believe that point has come as our involvement there nears its fourth year with no end in sight. And every day the costs in terms of human life and economic resources continue to escalate. The question of when “enough is enough” has been renewed in the debate over President George Bush’s new plan to increase U.S. troops by more than 20,000 to about 160,000 to help Iraqi forces improve security in the country. The president also plans to spend an additional $1 billion for Iraq reconstruction.

The same question of when “enough is enough” arose more than three decades ago in another war — Vietnam — that also was a civil conflict. Eventually, U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam when the reasons for being there became futile.

To some extent, the echoes of Vietnam are reverberating in Iraq today.

Recall the moral questions raised by the U.S. Catholic bishops in 1971: “In assessing our country’s involvement in Vietnam we must ask: Have we already reached, or passed, the point where the principle of proportionality becomes decisive? How much more of our resources of men and money should we commit to this struggle? Has the conflict in Vietnam provoked inhuman dimensions of suffering?”

The bishops answered: “It seems clear to us that whatever good we hope to achieve through continued involvement in this war is now outweighed by the destruction of human life and of moral values which it inflicts. It is our firm conviction ... that the speedy ending of this war is a moral imperative of the highest priority.”

Proportionality — which the bishops were referring to — is one principle of the Christian just-war tradition. This means, according to the Catechism of the Catholic Church, that “the use of arms must not produce evils and disorders graver than the evil to be eliminated.” It means that the damage inflicted and the costs incurred must be proportionate to the good that is expected.

In Iraq, more than 3,000 U.S. troops have been killed and more than 22,000 wounded. If troop levels are increased, these casualty numbers will surely rise. In addition, tens of thousands of Iraqis have lost their lives, and the death toll continues to mount.

The United States has spent an estimated $400 billion on this war, and with the planned increase in troops and new reconstruction money, this, too, will increase. This large expenditure also raises the concern of domestic urgencies (such as health care and poverty) and other international needs that have been neglected because of the Iraq adventure.

Such an investment in human lives and other resources might be justified assuming probability of success in achieving the “good to be expected” in Iraq. But like Vietnam, probability of success — another principle of the just-war tradition — is questionable in Iraq.

In the just-war tradition, probability of success means not using arms — or continuing their use — in a futile cause or in a situation where disproportionate means are required to achieve success. And success needs to be considered in terms of the reasons for going to war in the first place.

In Iraq, we went to war to rid the then-government of Saddam Hussein of weapons of mass destruction and to eliminate the the threat of his government obtaining nuclear weapons. But no weapons of mass destruction were found. Then the administration shifted its reasons for war to establishing a democratic government in Iraq. President Bush said last week our goal is to aid in the “survival of a young democracy.”

But is this a realistic expectation for U.S. troops, especially given the internal conflicts in Iraq? Isn’t this for Iraqis to resolve — shouldn’t they demonstrate their commitment to have a democracy and their willingness to do what is needed to bring about reconciliation of the competing ethnic and religious factions in their country? Are we asking our troops — and the use of our military power — to do an impossible job in the midst of a civil conflict?

A lesson of the Vietnam War was that the use of our military power — regardless of the number of troops deployed — is limited in resolving an internal conflict in another country. After a bloody, costly and futile struggle in Vietnam, we eventually came to the conclusion that there was no probability of success and that the costs were not proportionate to the good expected.

Have we reached this same point in Iraq? That’s the question before our country now.